America's Drug Problem and Its Policy of Denial

For almost 100 years, Americans have considered other countries the primary source of their drug problems. When the first drug laws were adopted in the early decades of this century, the public associated drugs with immigrant groups and minorities: opium with Chinese laborers in the west, cocaine with blacks, and marijuana with Mexican immigrants in the southwest. These drugs were seen as foreign threats to the social fabric, undermining traditional moral values and political stability. Today this link between foreigners and illicit drugs continues to influence United States international drug policy, prompting the government to use diplomacy, economic assistance, coercion, and military force to try to stop drugs from entering the country.

Americans strongly support government efforts to cut off foreign drug supplies. More than two-thirds of the respondents in a 1997 poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press considered drug control to be a "top priority" goal of United States foreign policy; only protecting American jobs and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons received higher scores. Similar views have prevailed in other surveys. A 1995 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations nationwide poll found that 86 percent of Americans consider "stopping the flow of drugs" one of the country's most important foreign policy goals. The close connection in the public mind between international initiatives and drug abuse, which is often experienced as an intensely local problem involving families, schools, and communities, gives this issue particular resonance in public views of foreign policy.

SUPPLYING AMERICA'S DEMAND

America's drug habit has historically been supplied from foreign sources: cocaine and marijuana from Latin America and the Caribbean; heroin from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle ( Burma, Laos, and Thailand) and South Asia's Golden Crescent ( Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran). However, in recent years a substantial percentage of illicit drug consumption in the United States has been met by illegal domestic production. In particular, many of the drugs gaining popularity among teenagers--marijuana, methamphetamines, and LSD--are produced at home as well as imported.

While much of the marijuana the country uses continues to be imported through Mexico and the Caribbean, domestic production now supplies an estimated one-third to one-half of America's consumption. Although a complete nationwide survey of illegal marijuana cultivation has never been made, government officials report major cultivation areas in states as diverse as New York, Kentucky, California, and Hawaii. Increased indoor cultivation, which allows for more selective hybridization, has accelerated the trend toward higher-potency marijuana. In 1996, the THC ( tetrahydrocannabinol) content of high-grade "sinsemilla" (seedless) marijuana ranged from 12 to 24 percent, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration ( DEA), compared to less than 2 percent THC in marijuana cultivated in the early 1970s. Even as potency has increased, marijuana prices, after rising during the 1980s, have in the 1990s fallen back to levels of the early 1980s. Depending on its quality, marijuana now sells for roughly the same as in 1982--as little as $40 per ounce, although prices for high-quality "boutique" marijuana strains can reach $900 per ounce.

The historic view that America's drug problems are predominantly foreign in origin is thus harder to sustain, given increasing domestic illegal drug production, not only of marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines but also of newer "designer" psychoactive drugs such as MDMA ( known as Ecstasy). Nonetheless, United States drug policy continues to concentrate on trying to reduce the foreign supply of drugs, both through efforts to reduce drug cultivation in other countries and to interdict drug traffic before it crosses America's borders. Unfortunately, the strategy of trying to reduce United States drug use by attacking drug supplies overseas is fundamentally flawed.

CERTIFICATION: THE "TOUGH" APPROACH

Emblematic of this focus on foreign sources is the United States government's annual "certification" process. Imposed by Congress on the executive branch in 1986, the concept of certification reflects a worldview that still classifies countries into producer, consumer, and transit categories. The intent of Congress was to put teeth into United States efforts to compel cooperation as well as to make the president accountable for enforcing a more vigorous international drug policy.

The certification legislation requires the president to identify annually those countries that are "significant direct or indirect sources" of illicit drugs "significantly affecting the United States." Inclusion on this list, which currently comprises 30 countries, automatically triggers certain sanctions unless the president decides to "certify" the country. Those deemed to have fully cooperated in drug control efforts are certified. Those deemed less cooperative are decertified, which results in the termination of United States assistance ( except for humanitarian and drug control funds), United States opposition to multilateral development loans for that country, and the stigma of being branded a drug-trafficking nation. This may carry negative economic repercussions beyond the aid-related sanctions included in the law; The Wall Street Journal reported in August 1997 that Colombia's decertification had contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty, causing investors to put off new projects.

A "national interest" waiver is used to justify suspending the penalties for a country that would otherwise have been decertified--a way to improve performance without actually cutting off assistance. Congress has the authority to overturn presidential decisions by passing a joint resolution within 30 days, but has never done so.

Under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush, the certification process was predictable and went largely unnoticed. Decertification was reserved for countries like Iran and Syria, with which the United States had limited or no relations, as well as Burma and Afghanistan, which together produce 90 percent of the world's illicit opium. Lebanon was consistently granted a national interest waiver. In 1988 and 1989, Panama was added to the decertification list, just before the United States intervened militarily to remove President Manuel Noriega for his involvement in drug trafficking.

Under President Bill Clinton, certification has become more rigorous. In 1994, Nigeria, a key trafficking country and a significant source of oil for the United States, was decertified for the first time. Also, Bolivia and Peru, the world's largest coca producers, joined a growing list of countries given a national interest waiver. In 1995, Colombia, a major source of cocaine and heroin; Paraguay, a cocaine transit country; and Pakistan, a prime producer of heroin, were added to the waiver list.

By 1996, certification had emerged as a major source of tension between the United States and its Latin American neighbors. The administration decertified Colombia for the first time because of alleged links between President Ernesto Samper and the drug cartels, which were believed to have contributed to his presidential campaign. Colombia was again decertified in 1997; Mexico, however, was certified, despite revelations of extensive drug-related government corruption that, as some observers noted, paralleled the situation in Colombia.

Critics both in the United States and Latin America argued that the certification process harmed relations with Mexico and Colombia without producing any measurable benefits. Moreover, a double standard appeared to influence the ultimate decisions. In 1996, trade between the United States and Colombia totaled $9 billion, while United States-Mexico trade reached $130 billion. Additionally, Mexico shares a border with the United States, making Mexican cooperation on a range of issues such as crime, immigration, and environmental protection essential to Washington.

Media coverage of the certification decisions was intense, especially in Latin America, where the decisions were widely viewed as demonstrations of United States imperialism. The idea of being formally judged by the United States remains objectionable to many countries. During the 1997 certification debate, the Mexican government rejected the concept of certification, pointing out that the United States is responsible for its own drug problem and has no right to pass unilateral judgment on other countries when it does not also judge its own performance. Although Congress did not overturn the administration's 1997 decision to certify Mexico, some members of the House of Representatives have indicated that a similar decision in 1998 will be met with stiff congressional opposition.

In practice, the consequences of decertification vary widely, depending on a country's reliance on United States and international aid. For major producer countries such as Burma, which is already isolated from the international community ( and subject to United States sanctions on investment), the material consequences of decertification are virtually zero. However, for some countries, such as Bolivia, Haiti, Laos, and Cambodia, annual United States and multilateral bank aid amounts to a significant proportion of their gdp, making them especially vulnerable to the threat of decertification.

Relative vulnerability is only one part of the equation as to whether United States pressure will affect cooperation; even more important is the government's capacity to address illicit drug production and trafficking, as well as the sheer scale of the problem. The degree of United States leverage does not determine whether pressure will compel action. For example, the United States has considerable influence over a country like Haiti, but the Haitian government is so weak, particularly in the area of law enforcement, that it is largely incapable of producing drug control results, regardless of United States pressure.

A CERTIFIED FAILURE?

What impact has certification had in its 11-year history? From the United States perspective, the primary measure of the success of drug control efforts overseas would be reductions in foreign opium, coca, and marijuana cultivation as well as declining availability of foreign drug supplies coming into the United States. Reductions would presumably lead to higher domestic drug prices. However, worldwide opium production has doubled in the past decade, while coca production has nearly doubled.

The price and purity of drugs in the United States market are also traditional measures of drug control success. Reductions in supplies should make drugs more expensive and less pure ( as dealers dilute purity to maintain profit margins). This in turn should prevent new drug use and drive addicts to go "cold turkey" or find treatment. However, since 1981, heroin's average retail price has fallen by more than half while its purity now approaches 50 percent, compared to only 16 percent in 1986. During the same period, the price of cocaine has dropped by almost half.

Administration officials point to some successes from the certification process: increased numbers of arrests of major traffickers in Colombia following decertification; reorganization of the antinarcotics police in Mexico after indications of widespread corruption made decertification a strong possibility in 1997; more vigorous efforts to reduce coca cultivation by the Bolivian government following national interest waivers in 1994 and 1995. However, these examples of government action that may have been influenced by the certification process have not produced measurable results in terms of reduced drug availability in the United States, the ultimate goal of United States international drug control efforts.

The certification process also has negative consequences for other United States interests. Focusing on one aspect of often complex bilateral relations can distort the management of foreign policy. In Latin America, where the process has been especially acrimonious, relations with half a dozen countries are dominated by United States narcotics control concerns. The unilateral nature of certification--where the United States passes judgment on other countries--undermines the administration's position that the nations of the Western Hemisphere should look to the United States as a partner in a broader effort to establish a community of democracies.

In the past year, momentum has been building for finding alternatives to the current certification process. Both the administration and the Organization of American States ( OAS) are exploring new multilateral approaches to determining whether countries are fully cooperating in international drug control efforts. Discussion of these new approaches is on the agenda for the April 1998 Summit of the Americas meeting in Santiago, Chile. A more comprehensive system that would include an assessment of United States efforts along with those of other drug producing, consuming, and transiting countries, could be administered through an independent organization, perhaps linked to the OAS or the United Nations. This would broaden the approach beyond its current unilateral context as well as encourage political recognition of the global nature of the drug problem.

A KEY TO LASTING PROGRESS

The United States is the world's largest drug market in terms of revenue. According to the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 22 million Americans reported using illicit drugs at least once in 1996, while 12 million used drugs regularly ( once a month or more). During the past five years, drug use among teens, especially of marijuana, has climbed dramatically.

What progress has been made in the past decade has come from reduced demand, which has declined in the face of increasing supplies of ever cheaper drugs. Between 1986 and 1992, marijuana and cocaine use dropped by half, reflecting the power of health concerns and negative social attitudes toward drugs ( accelerated by the sudden cocaine overdose death of sports star Len Bias in 1986). However, public perceptions of the dangers of drugs have changed, and both adults and teens are more tolerant of drug use than they were five years ago. Reversing this trend will require intensive prevention and education efforts that build on the research of the past decade.

Extensive studies have found that school prevention programs can reduce drug use by half and new alcohol use by a third among young teens. These programs, built on social-learning theory, teach children to recognize the internal and external pressures that influence them to smoke, drink, and use drugs. Children also learn how to resist these pressures through role-playing in the classroom. The cost of these programs ranges from $15 to $25 per pupil, including classroom materials and teacher training. Program results are stronger when prevention includes families, media, and the community in a comprehensive attack on alcohol, tobacco, and drug use. Anti-drug ads by the Partnership for a Drug Free America have intensified negative attitudes toward illegal drugs, particularly in markets where the ads appear frequently.

Treatment has also proved effective in reducing drug abuse and drug crime. National studies that have followed tens of thousands of addicts through different kinds of programs report that the single most important factor in measuring a program's success is length of time in treatment. One-third of those who stay in treatment longer than three months are drug-free a year after leaving treatment. The success rate jumps to two-thirds when treatment lasts a year or longer. Programs that provide intensive, highly structured treatment with supportive follow-up services, such as job training and housing referral, report even better results.

Treatment is less expensive than the alternatives. An untreated addict can cost society an estimated $44,000 annually, compared with an average of $19,000 for a year of residential treatment or $2,500 for an outpatient program. A 1994 statewide study in California found that $1 invested in alcohol and drug treatment saved taxpayers $7.14 in future costs. Drug courts, which divert nonviolent drug offenders from prison to court-supervised treatment, are also cost-effective. Studies report that drug courts cut recidivism by half among treated offenders at a small fraction of the cost of incarceration, which runs about $30,000 a year.

Treatment is also more cost-effective than supply reduction efforts. According to a 1994 RAND Corporation study, $34 million invested in treatment reduces cocaine use in the United States as much as $783 million spent for foreign source country supply control programs or $366 million spent for interdiction. Domestic enforcement produces equivalent results for about seven times the amount invested in treatment; $246 million in domestic enforcement reduces cocaine use as much as $34 million in treatment.

MORE MONEY, FEWER RESULTS?

In the past decade, the government's drug control spending has more than tripled, climbing from $4.7 billion in 1987 to $16 billion in 1997. Most of this growth has supported domestic drug enforcement and international interdiction, which account for more than half the total $105 billion spent on federal drug control since 1989.

The single largest enforcement expenditure is for prisons. Increasing prison costs stem not only from climbing drug arrests but also from mandatory federal minimum sentences that have resulted in longer prison stays for drug offenders. More than 1.7 million people are behind bars in America. More than two-thirds have serious drug problems, yet intensive, rigorous treatment is available for less than 10 percent of these offenders. In 1997, the federal drug budget spent more for prisons than for prevention.

Although President Clinton has clearly articulated the importance of reducing the demand for drugs in the 1997 and 1998 National Drug Control Strategy reports, federal spending priorities have remained essentially unchanged. Efforts to cut off supplies of drugs through interdiction and enforcement continue to dominate the government's drug budget, accounting for two-thirds of total spending.

Despite impressive seizures at the border, on the high seas, and in other countries, foreign drugs are cheaper and more readily available today than two decades ago. Domestic production of illegal drugs such as marijuana and methamphetamines is increasing, further reducing the potential impact of interdiction on United States drug use. United States foreign supply reduction efforts have also caused problems of their own, especially in Latin America, where narcotics control dominates the diplomatic agenda with the United States. The unintended consequences of these programs have sometimes been severe, including political unrest among peasant farmers who rely on drug crops for their livelihood; human rights abuses as governments try to suppress drug cultivation; increased corruption among police and military forces; and expanding roles for the military in drug enforcement and internal security in countries where democracy is still fragile.

Ultimately, the costs incurred--both in the United States and overseas--in pursuing the supply-side drug strategy will not produce the promised benefits of reduced drug availability and higher drug prices. The largest drug profits are made within the United States at street-level sales, not in foreign poppy or coca fields or on the high seas. The total cost of cultivating, refining, and smuggling cocaine to the United States accounts for less than 15 percent of domestic retail prices. Recent anecdotal evidence from the southwestern United States suggests that smuggling costs may have increased as a result of intensified border interdiction: Mexican traffickers are said to be offering as much as half their cocaine shipments in exchange for safe passage. Still, the value of drugs at that point is only a fraction of their retail price on American streets. As one DEA official explained, "The average drug organization can afford to lose as much as 80 percent of its product and still be profitable."

MAKING DEMAND THE FOCUS

The nation's drug control strategy should shift from a primary focus on reducing drug supplies to reducing the demand for drugs through prevention, education, treatment, and community anti-drug coalitions. Law enforcement has a critically important role to play; studies indicate that street-level enforcement is more effective in driving up drug prices and has the added benefit of making neighborhoods safer. In the international arena, greater emphasis should be placed on attacking the growing power of the drug cartels that challenge the integrity of political, financial, and judicial institutions in this country and abroad. The United States should concentrate on efforts both to strengthen democratic governments and to combat money laundering, drug-related corruption, and violence through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. For too long, United States drug policy has been driven by the need to appear "tough" on drugs, regardless of results. The United States should leave behind the distinction between "tough" and "soft" approaches to drug abuse and concentrate its attention, research, and resources on determining what actually works.